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Tinker at a Breaking Point: Why the Specter of 
Cyberbullying Cannot Excuse Impermissible Public 
School Regulation of Off-Campus Student Speech 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyberbullying is essentially speech that is disseminated via 
electronic or digital means and is intended to embarrass, hurt, or 
harass another person.1 The most common conduits of cyberbullying 
include text messages, instant messages, email messages, social 
networking sites such as Facebook or MySpace, and microblogging 
sites such as Twitter. Cyberbullying is considered more pernicious 
than traditional bullying because it allows “cruel or sadistic behavior 
to be amplified and publicized, not just on the campus [of a school], 
but throughout the world.”2 This amplification of the bullying 
behavior may contribute to the “extreme emotional reaction”3 
manifest when a victim of cyberbullying takes his or her own life. 
Legislators, educators, parents, scholars, and students have 
responded to the deaths of teenagers Ryan Hulligan,4 Megan Meier,5 
 
 1. See, e.g., Nat’l Crime Prevention Council, CYBERBULLYING FAQ FOR TEENS, 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/cyberbullying-faq-for-teens (last visited Feb. 8, 
2011); St. Peter’s School, TERMS YOU SHOULD KNOW, http://www.stpeterprince.org/ 
terms_you_should_know.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 2. Jeff Lieberman, Rutgers Student’s Suicide Prompts Privacy, Cyber-Bullying Debates 
(PBS NewsHour broadcast Oct. 1, 2010), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/social_issues/july-dec10/rutgers1_10-01.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Thirteen-year-old Ryan took his own life in 2003 after suffering the humiliation of a 
classmate fabricating an online relationship with him and then telling him it was all a joke in 
front of a group of friends. After his death, Ryan’s parents discovered an alarming number of 
instant messages and emails sent before Ryan’s suicide that were harassing and degrading to 
their son. See Tiffani N. Garlic, Dad Uses Son’s Suicide to Show Dangers of Cyber-Bullying While 
Speaking at Somerset County School, NJ.COM (Oct. 17, 2010, 6:02 AM), http:// 
www.nj.com/news/local/index.ssf/2010/10/dad_uses_sons_suicide_to_show.html; RYAN’S 
STORY, http://www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org/index.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).  
 5. Megan’s mother found Megan’s body in a closet after Megan hung herself before 
her thirteenth birthday. Megan’s breaking point came when a sixteen-year old online “friend” 
started sending steady, cruel messages to Megan via email and MySpace. Megan died before 
anyone realized the boy was not real; a neighborhood parent had allegedly created the 
fictitious profile and sent the offensive messages herself. Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s 
Suicide, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id= 
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Phoebe Prince,6 Tyler Clementi,7 and others8 with a vigorous debate 
over what role school entities can and should play in protecting 
students by prohibiting this type of speech.9  
A main focus of the debate is whether a public school entity that 
regulates cyberbullying infringes on a student’s First Amendment 
right to free speech. Under current and proposed statutory 
schemes,10 speech that originates and often takes place entirely off-
campus, without the use of school computers or other school 
property and while the student is engaged in activities or events that 
are in no way related to the school or to any school purpose, could 
be regulated. Thus the question is whether the prevention of 
 
3882520&page=1. 
 6. “[S]mart and charming” Phoebe, an Irish immigrant to Massachusetts, took her 
own life at fifteen and just days before she was to attend her school’s winter cotillion. She had 
endured bullying at school that soon spilled over into “taunting text messages and harassing 
postings on Facebook.” Kathy McCabe, Teen’s Suicide Prompts a Look at Bullying, 
BOSTON.COM (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/ 
2010/01/24/teens_suicide_prompts_a_look_at_bullying/; see also Yunji De Nies et al., Mean 
Girls: Cyberbullying Blamed for Teen Suicides, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Parenting/girls-teen-suicide-calls-attention-cyberbullying/ 
story?id=9685026. 
 7. Tyler, a freshman musician at Rutgers University, died when he jumped off the 
George Washington Bridge in New York after his roommate and a classmate broadcast live 
webcam footage of Tyler in a sexual encounter with another man over the Internet. 
Lieberman, supra note 2. 
 8. Rachael Neblett suffered cyberbullying at the hand of an anonymous stalker and 
took her life in 2006. Kelly Foreman, Cyber Crimes Division Created to Fight Internet Crimes, 
KY. LAW ENFORCEMENT, Winter 2008, at 18, available at http:// 
docjt.jus.state.ky.us/Magazines/Issue%2028/Cyber%20Crime_KLE%20Winter08.pdf. 
  Fifteen-year-old Jeffrey Johnston took his own life after suffering for years as a 
victim of cyberbullying. Wayne K. Roustan, Boca Raton Conference Targets Cyberbullying 
Threat, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Oct. 23, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-10-
23/news/fl-cyberbullying-boca-20101023_1_cyberbullying-phoebe-prince-safe-schools-
institute. Several other teen suicides have also been linked to cyberbullying. 
 9. See, e.g, Gil Kaufman, Students Speak out Against ‘Senseless’ Cyberbullying, MTV 
NEWS (Oct 14, 2010, 6:52 AM), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1649958/ 
20101013/story.jhtml; First Amendment Center, Cyber Bullying & Public Schools Online 
Symposium, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/collection.aspx?item=cyberbullying_ 
public_schools; Laurie L. Levenson, Cyberbullying and a Student’s Suicide: What Isn’t Known 
About Suicides, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Sept. 30, 2010, 9:43 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/30/cyberbullying-and-a-students-
suicide/what-isnt-known-about-suicides. 
 10. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2009); 
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A (2008); H.R. 2569, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, §§ 37H-
37O (2010); 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010) 1303.1-A (a)(1)(i). 
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cyberbullying is so compelling an interest as to justify the ability of 
public school entities to regulate such a broad scope of student 
speech. 
This debate sets states’ clear interests in protecting children and 
maintaining a safe and educationally conducive environment at 
school and at school-sponsored activities against the individual 
student’s constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech. 
Though there is a compelling need to protect children from the 
insidious harm inflicted through cyberbullying, many statutes and 
local school policies permitting broad limitations on individual 
speech are not the least restrictive means through which such an 
interest is met. Unfortunately, considering the strong policy 
arguments on both sides of this issue obfuscates rather than clarifies 
where the appropriate balance lies. Children are often the weakest 
and most easily victimized members of society. Consequently, they 
not only deserve but often desperately need protection. Additionally, 
the effects of cyberbullying can be pernicious and particularly 
destructive to children and youth in their early adolescence.11 
However, First Amendment scholarship and jurisprudence make it 
clear that freedom of speech is a most decidedly cherished and 
vigorously protected constitutional right.  
This Comment does not propose that cyberbullying should be 
tolerated without any consequences whatsoever. It recognizes that 
much of what is categorized as cyberbullying is a distasteful and 
potentially damaging form of speech. However, in order to 
appropriately defend the individual’s right to free speech, the 
regulation by public-school entities of off-campus student speech 
must be narrowly tailored to prevent a limited class of speech that is 
either already under the school’s authority to regulate or that rises to 
the level of a “true threat.”12 Thus, schools would maintain the 
power to regulate speech through which the speaker means “to 
 
 11. Cyberbullying has been shown to be correlated with lower self-esteem and increased 
tendencies towards suicide. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research 
Summary: Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2010), 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_self_esteem_research_fact_sheet.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2011); Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary: 
Cyberbullying and Suicide, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2010), 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_suicide_research_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2011).  
 12. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
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communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”13 The alternative—allowing a broad infringement of 
students’ First Amendment rights by public-school entities in 
misguided and sometimes inefficient efforts to control 
cyberbullying—sweeps in too much speech that should be protected. 
Such actions cannot be upheld as permissible under the 
Constitution.  
Therefore, school administrators must exercise care in how far 
they are willing to go to regulate student speech. Regulation of 
student speech that (1) originates and concludes wholly outside the 
physical boundaries of the school campus, (2) is neither created nor 
propagated at an event that is not reasonably discernible as a school 
function, (3) is facilitated with devices and services that are not 
school owned, and (4) does not “materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school”14 is most certainly a violation of the First 
Amendment. Such an infringement of a constitutionally guaranteed 
right would surely subject school administrators to liability under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. However, the law governing school entities’ 
regulation of student speech that falls short in one of these four 
elements is an inconsistent legal labyrinth of state and federal 
decisions. 
Recent judicial events place the concerns in this nascent area of 
law in stark relief and present the opportunity to carefully evaluate 
where the law currently stands and where it should go from here. 
Courts have not extensively adjudicated disputes centered on the 
question of whether and to what extent school entities may regulate 
student-on-student off-campus speech that meets the definition of 
cyberbullying. However, in cases where school entities have 
regulated student-on-teacher or student-on-administrator 
cyberbullying,15 there is not only a split amongst various courts, but 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966), cited in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).  
 15. Student-on-teacher or student-on-administrator cyberbullying includes instances of 
student speech where students have emailed, posted, or texted lewd, harassing, violent, or 
threatening material directed at a teacher or administrator. 
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itself split when it published two opposite holdings on cases with 
almost identical fact patterns.16  
This Comment includes an analysis of the incongruous and 
inconclusive case law on point, an examination of the two cases that 
literally split the Third Circuit, and a recommendation that courts 
employ the “true threat” doctrine in the cyberbullying debate. Thus, 
schools may permissibly regulate true threats to students while 
preserving acceptable protection for individual students’ First 
Amendment rights. 
II. JURISPRUDENCE: REGULATION OF STUDENT SPEECH BY PUBLIC 
SCHOOL ENTITIES 
The case law related to regulation of off-campus student speech 
is extremely inconsistent. An attempt to contextualize the current 
jurisprudential landscape requires first, a review of the precedent 
under which a public school may constitutionally regulate student 
speech generally and second, a case-by-case analysis of the discordant 
decisions arising in state and federal courts when public school 
entities attempted to regulate off-campus student speech specifically. 
A. Foundational Principles 
Three cases decided by the United States Supreme Court set the 
basic guidelines within which public schools can permissibly regulate 
student speech: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,17 Bethel School District v. Fraser,18 and Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier.19 Generally, Tinker provides strong protection 
for student speech unless such speech causes a material and 
substantial interference with the appropriate discipline and operation 
of the school or infringes on the rights of another.20 Fraser serves as 
an exception to Tinker’s general rule when the school can show that 
 
 16. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g 
granted No. 08-438, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted No. 
07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 17. 393 U.S. 503. 
 18. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 19. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 20. 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
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the student’s speech was offensive, lewd, or indecent.21 And 
Hazelwood avers that a school may regulate student speech that bears 
the imprimatur of the school so long as such regulation is shown to 
be reasonably related to the school’s pedagogical concerns.22 As the 
factual circumstances of these cases have bearing on the discussion at 
hand, a brief summary of each follows. 
1. Tinker’s material and substantial interference  
In Tinker, several junior high and high school students planned 
to wear black armbands to school as part of a protest against the 
Vietnam War.23 Administrators at the students’ respective schools 
discovered the planned protest and adopted a policy prohibiting the 
wearing of armbands at school.24 The students knew of the policy, 
but wore the armbands to school anyway.25 They were subsequently 
sent home and suspended from school unless they returned without 
the armbands.26 The Tinker Court held that this was an improper 
violation of the students’ First Amendment rights.27 The Court 
reasoned that unless the students’ expressive conduct “‘materially 
and substantially interfer[ed] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school’ [or] . . . collid[ed] with the 
rights of others,” it could not be regulated without offending the 
First Amendment.28  
Additionally, the Tinker opinion included other guidance often 
cited by lower courts examining this issue and thus applicable to the 
contemporary debate. First, the Court stated that for fifty years it 
had held that neither “students [n]or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse 
gate.”29 Additionally, the Court emphasized that in this case there 
 
 21. 478 U.S. at 685. 
 22. 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
 23. 393 U.S. at 504. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 513–14. 
 28. Id. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).  
 29. Id. at 506 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 
U.S. 404 (1923)).  
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were not any “threats or acts of violence on school premises.”30 
Further, the Court clarified that “a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint” is not sufficient reason for a public-school entity to 
infringe on an individual’s free-speech rights.31 Importantly, the 
Court noted that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority 
over their students” and that students, whether in or out of school, 
are “‘persons’ under our Constitution” and are “possessed of 
fundamental rights.”32 Finally, there is a small piece of the opinion 
that subsequent courts have used to support the broad application of 
Tinker to speech that is found to have occurred off-campus:  
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any 
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.33 
2. Fraser’s offensive, lewd, and indecent speech  
Conversely, in Fraser,34 the Court upheld a school 
administrator’s decision to suspend a student who used “an 
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor” in a speech 
delivered at a school assembly.35 Though there was not necessarily a 
material and substantial interference with school operations, the 
Fraser court held that the school acted “within its permissible 
authority in imposing sanctions . . . in response to [the student’s] 
offensively lewd and indecent speech.”36 In a later case, the Court 
outlined the two main principles arising from Fraser:37 first, that “the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings,”38 and second, that the material and substantial-interference 
 
 30. Id. at 508. 
 31. Id. at 509. 
 32. Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). 
 34. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 35. Id. at 677–78. 
 36. Id. at 685. 
 37. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007). 
 38. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, quoted in Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97. 
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analysis under Tinker is “not absolute.”39 Fraser stands as an example 
of a fact-driven case in which the Court was willing to make an 
exception to the Tinker standard. Providing an exception to a 
generally speech-protective rule is not an uncommon stance for the 
Court where lewd, graphic, and sexual speech is at issue.40 It seems 
even less of a surprise where such speech was asserted in a setting 
where minor students were essentially a captive audience.41 
3. Hazelwood’s imprimatur and reasonable pedagogical concerns  
Additionally, in Hazelwood,42 the Court upheld a school’s 
regulation of student speech when it held that the principal’s 
removal of two pages from an edition of the school paper was not an 
infringement of the students’ First Amendment rights.43 The excised 
pages included two articles that detailed student experiences with 
divorce and teen pregnancy but also contained other articles that 
were not offensive.44 The principal, upon reading the articles in 
question, believed first, that the topics were inappropriate for some 
of the students at the school, and second, that there was a risk some 
of the students involved in the pregnancy article could be identified 
from the context of the articles, and that such identification—even if 
unintended—would be a violation of the students’ privacy rights.45 
The Court held that the principal was justified in “exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech” in the 
 
 39. Morse, 551 U.S. at 394. 
 40. As early as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court 
demonstrated a willingness to regulate speech that is lewd, obscene, and utterly without 
redeeming social import or value, particularly where the state interest in preserving morality is 
more compelling than allowing freedom of this type of speech. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Redrup v. New York, 
386 U.S. 767 (1967) (setting the stage for a period of time in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
would review and summarily reverse whenever five justices voted using their own individual 
tests); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of 
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (holding that obscenity was speech that was “utterly without 
redeeming social value”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 41. Courts have indicated a willingness to allow more regulation of lewd and offensive 
speech when the audience consists of minors who are expected or required to attend the event 
at which the speech is offered. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684–85; Morse, 551 U.S. 393.  
 42. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 43. Id. at 272–73. 
 44. Id. at 263, 264 n.1. 
 45. Id. at 263. 
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paper because the newspaper was not a public forum and because 
school entities have authority to regulate speech that occurs “in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”46 
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood form the jurisprudential 
foundations for, and the basic limitations on, how and when public-
school entities may constitutionally regulate students’ speech.47 
Despite the seemingly strong protection afforded student speech 
under Tinker and the relatively limited exceptions in Fraser and 
Hazelwood, a rash of cases examining student-on-teacher and/or 
student-on-administrator cyberbullying have resulted in holdings 
that are surprisingly inconsistent when compared with these three 
foundational cases and are irreconcilable when compared with each 
other. The resulting jurisprudential morass includes narrow 
constructions of these foundational cases as well as expansive 
applications where almost any student speech could be permissibly 
regulated by a public school entity. Indeed, courts have willingly 
extended Tinker48 not to protect speech but to allow regulation of 
speech that happens not only outside the classroom but wholly 
beyond the physical borders of the school campus and often within 
the confines of students’ homes.49 Such expansive application 
enlarges the Tinker standard beyond a reasonable interpretation and 
places courts on the verge of granting schools unprecedented 
authority to regulate speech that, though unpleasant, falls squarely 
within the protection of the First Amendment. 
 
 46. Id. at 270, 273. 
 47. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), could be included here as well because it 
upheld a principal’s regulation of off-campus student speech offered at a school-sanctioned 
event that was contrary to the anti-drug policy of the school. This case is discussed later in this 
Comment, see infra Part II.B.1, because in this analysis, Morse’s holding regarding whether the 
speech was offered on- or off-campus seems more pertinent than the holding that speech 
advocating the use of illegal drugs may be regulated outside of the Tinker analysis. 
 48.  Several such cases are discussed throughout this Comment. 
 49. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) 
(indicating that “conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which . . . materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is . . . not 
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech” but not explicitly 
authorizing regulation of speech that is wholly off-campus (emphasis added)). 
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B. Reaching Beyond School Boundaries: On-campus vs. Off-campus 
Speech 
Schools may permissibly regulate speech that meets Tinker’s 
material and substantial interference standard or Fraser’s lewd, 
offensive, and indecent standard when such speech occurs on-
campus, meaning within the physical boundaries of the school 
grounds, or at official school events such as assemblies, field trips, 
athletic contests, and so on. The Tinker standard evolved under facts 
occurring on a school campus.50 Fraser’s lewd speech was given at an 
official school event.51 Additionally, under Hazelwood, schools may 
permissibly regulate expressive speech that reasonably bears the 
imprimatur of the school, such as newspapers, drama productions, 
concerts, recitals, and the like.52 However, regulation of speech 
occurring via the Internet is an entirely new playing field—one in 
which students can express themselves from almost any location in 
the world and can do so anonymously if they so choose. 
Cyberbullying can originate at home, in a park, from an office, or on 
school property. Therefore, the first question that state and federal 
courts have to resolve in examining this issue is “For purposes of 
regulation, is the student speech happening ‘on-campus’ or ‘off-
campus’?”53 Generally, if the speech occurs off-campus, the school’s 
authority to regulate it is significantly diminished unless the speech is 
otherwise unprotected.54 
1. Explicitly on-campus speech: on school property or at school-sanctioned 
events 
The clearest answer to the question of whether speech occurs on- 
or off-campus is that speech transpires on-campus if the student 
speaks, offers, or creates it on school property. In Klein v. Smith, a 
 
 50. Id. at 504. 
 51. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986). 
 52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988). 
 53. Indeed, courts have acknowledged this distinction as the “threshold issue” when 
determining whether the school-entity regulation was constitutional or not. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. 
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002). 
 54. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372–73 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Fenton v. 
Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that a school entity could regulate 
“fighting words” even when they were offered off-campus and outside of any school-
sanctioned activity because they are unprotected speech)). 
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student saw a teacher in a restaurant parking lot and made an 
offensive gesture by extending his middle finger.55 Pursuant to a 
school policy prohibiting “vulgar or extremely inappropriate 
language or conduct directed to a staff member,” the school 
suspended the student for ten days.56 The U.S. district court in 
Maine held that the connection between an offensive physical 
gesture made by a student to a teacher and the “proper and orderly 
operation of the school’s activities [was] . . . far too attenuated” to 
justify impinging on the student’s First Amendment rights.57 The 
gesture was made off of school premises, away from any school 
facilities, when neither the student nor the teacher were “engaged in 
any school activity or associated in any way with school premises.”58 
Courts have similarly held that written student speech—such as an 
underground newspaper—that is created, offered, and propagated 
away from the school property cannot be regulated by the school 
without offense to the First Amendment.59 
However, schools may constitutionally regulate student speech 
that technically happens off school property but is related to a 
school-sanctioned activity or event. In Morse v. Frederick, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to implicate the 
unique concerns of the school entity when a student held up a 
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while observing the 
Olympic torch relay from a position across the street from the 
school.60 Though the student was away from school property, the 
Court reasoned that (1) the event was during school hours, (2) it 
was approved by the administration as a class trip, (3) the school 
rules provided that students were subject to student conduct rules 
while at the approved trip, (4) the student was surrounded by other 
 
 55. 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1440–41 (D. Me. 1986). 
 56. Id. at 1441. 
 57. Id. at 1441–42 (quoting the school policy). 
 58. Id. at 1441.  
 59. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (holding that a school had impermissibly punished the speech of students who 
created and sold an offensive publication off campus that was not related to the school or to 
any school activity); Shanly v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cnty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 970–
71, 978 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding the school’s discipline of students an impermissible 
infringement of the First Amendment where the speech in question was a newspaper that was 
not disruptive and was distributed away from the school property). 
 60. 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007). 
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students and teachers, and (5) the group was located just across the 
street from the school.61 Morse indicates that in addition to 
regulating on-campus speech, there is room to regulate off-campus 
speech that meets some or all of the above factors, the most relevant 
perhaps being that the event is school sanctioned, and that school 
rules of behavior apply.62 
Though neither of these cases deals specifically with offensive 
Internet speech that could be classified as cyberbullying, they set a 
workable boundary for where a school’s authority ends and a 
student’s autonomy begins. Significantly, although many cases 
involving cyberbullying seem to indicate a preference for a 
broadening of this boundary, some have situated themselves 
comfortably and squarely within the “on school property” or “at a 
school-sanctioned event” boundaries. 
In one case examining an instance of speech that, at least facially, 
meets the definition of student-on-student cyberbullying, a U.S. 
district court in Washington held that a website created by a student 
away from school, and without the use of any school computers or 
resources, had a distinctly “out-of-school nature.”63 In Emmett v. 
Kent School District, the student was suspended for five days after he 
created a website on which he posted fake obituaries of his friends 
and invited visitors to vote on who would die next.64 The court 
reasoned that unlike the speech in Fraser, the website was not 
offered in a school assembly, and unlike Hazelwood, it was not 
offered as part of an official school publication, class, or project.65 
The court went on to say that the student speech was “entirely 
outside of the school’s supervision or control” even if the content 
seemed clearly connected to the school.66 
In contrast, when examining other instances of cyberbullying, 
some courts have been willing to extend the schoolmaster’s reach 
and allow school entities to regulate student speech occurring off-
 
 61. Id. at 400–01. 
 62. Id. at 399–401. 
 63. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wa. 
2000). 
 64. Id. at 1089. The student was initially expelled, but the expulsion was later modified 
to a five-day suspension. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1090. 
 66. Id. 
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campus pursuant to two basic analyses. One is more moderate and 
allows school entities to regulate off-campus student speech when 
there is a “sufficient nexus” between the student speech and the 
operations of the school.67 The second allows school entities to 
regulate off-campus student speech when the school can show 
merely a foreseeable risk of a material and substantial interference of 
school operations.68 Both approaches allow impermissibly broad 
regulation of student speech by schools.  
2. Implicitly on-campus speech: the sufficient nexus 
As noted previously, language in the Tinker decision indicated 
the possibility that schools could permissibly regulate out-of-
classroom speech.69 Fraser buoyed the assertion that schools may 
have authority to regulate behavior beyond classroom walls by 
rearticulating the policy that public education had the responsibility 
to “prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic,” that part of that 
preparation included “inculcat[ing] [students with] the habits and 
manners of civility,”70 and that generally, “the constitutional rights 
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”71 Courts have applied these 
statements liberally in granting school entities the authority to 
regulate not just speech outside of a classroom but speech that 
occurs completely away from campus and often in the privacy of a 
student’s home. If such speech is aimed at the school or someone at 
the school and then reaches the school or is accessed at school in 
 
 67. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 
2002).  
 68. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 69. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. To reiterate, the case states:  
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it 
stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not 
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.  
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis added). 
 70. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES 
AUSTIN BEARD & MARY RITTER BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 
(1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 71.  Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985)). 
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some form, there may be a sufficient nexus to regulate the speech 
under Tinker. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
District articulated the impermissibly expansive and frustratingly 
ambiguous “sufficient nexus” standard.72 The case arose when an 
eighth-grade student used a computer at his home to create a 
website that was then available via the Internet.73 The website 
contained “derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening 
comments” directed at one of the student’s teachers and the 
principal of his school.74 The website and its attendant pages were 
subsequently viewed by students, faculty members, and 
administrators at the student’s school.75 In answering the question of 
whether this was speech that occurred on- or off-campus, the court 
quoted Hazelwood, saying, “[a] school need not tolerate student 
speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission’ even 
though the government could not censor similar speech outside the 
school.”76 The court went on to explain that as long as there is a 
“sufficient nexus between the [digital or electronic communication] 
and the school campus to consider the speech as occurring on-
campus,” then the analysis under Tinker, Fraser, and/or Hazelwood 
could move forward.77 Thus, if a sufficient nexus can be shown, the 
speech becomes, essentially, on-campus speech and can be regulated 
under the same standards as speech that is explicitly made on school 
property or as part of a school-sanctioned event or activity. 
Importantly, the Bethlehem court provided two general factors 
that come into play when determining whether there is a sufficient 
nexus to justify the school entity’s regulation of the student speech. 
To establish a sufficient nexus, the student speech must be “speech 
that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel [and] is 
brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its 
originator.”78 Though broader than the requirement that the speech 
 
 72. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d  at 865. 
 73. Id. at 850. 
 74. Id. at 851. 
 75. Id. at 851–52. 
 76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 865. But see Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801 (N.D. Ohio 
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happen on school property or in conjunction with a school-
sanctioned event or activity, the sufficient nexus standard at least 
maintains the threshold question of determining whether the speech 
occurred on- or off-campus. Other courts have found this threshold 
question unnecessary if the school can show that there is at least a 
foreseeable risk that the speech would lead to a material and 
substantial interference with school discipline and operations. 
3. Foreseeable risk of a material and substantial interference 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has demonstrated a 
proclivity to stretch Tinker beyond the sufficient nexus standard of 
Bethlehem and to encourage a rule that would allow public school 
entities to regulate any student speech that would create a 
foreseeable risk of a material and substantial interference to the 
operation of the school. This extremely broad standard is exemplified 
first in Wisniewski v. Board of Education,79 and second in Doninger v. 
Niehoff.80 
In Wisniewski, an eighth-grader created an icon for use in his 
instant messaging program.81 The icon was “a pistol firing a bullet at 
a person’s head above which were dots representing splattered 
blood.”82 Text that accompanied the icon said, “Kill Mr. 
VanderMolen,” who was the student’s teacher.83 The eighth-grader 
sent the icon to some of his friends but it was never sent to the 
school or to the teacher.84 The court did not even ask the “threshold 
question”85 of whether the speech was on- or off-campus, but 
instead immediately applied the Tinker standard and held that the 
student’s off-campus speech could have “create[d] a foreseeable risk 
of substantial disruption within a school.”86 The court specified that 
under Tinker the decision of whether speech will “materially and 
 
2002) (holding that a school’s discipline of a student based on the content of a website viewed 
at school was impermissible pursuant to the First Amendment). 
 79. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 80. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 81. 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
 82. Id. at 36. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002). 
 86. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. 
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substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school” is left to 
school officials’ reasonable conclusions.87  
The court’s foreseeable risk test was also applied in Doninger 
when the court held that the school permissibly punished a student 
for posting a pejorative blog regarding an administrative decision 
with which the student disagreed.88 The court stated in dicta that if 
the student had delivered what she wrote on the Internet via 
handbills at school, her speech would have been subject to the Fraser 
rule, but then admitted that “[i]t is not clear . . . that Fraser applies 
to off-campus speech.”89 Ultimately, the court found that under the 
previous holding in Wisniewski the Tinker standard applied and held 
that the student’s Internet post “foreseeably create[d] a risk of 
substantial disruption within the school environment.”90 
Thus, various courts have engaged in incongruent analyses 
ranging from a moderate application of the foundational cases to a 
liberal use of alternative theories under which schools can more 
aggressively regulate student off-campus speech. Some, like Emmett, 
hold to the proposition that there is a threshold question to be 
answered—did the speech occur on- or off-campus? If it is on-
campus speech or speech that occurs as part of a school sanctioned 
event, the school entity will be allowed broad, discretionary 
regulation of the student speech. If it is off-campus speech, some 
courts will limit the school’s regulatory authority. Others, such as 
Bethlehem, hold that student speech does not have to actually occur 
on-campus to be deemed “on-campus speech.” Student speech can 
be implicitly on-campus if the school can show a sufficient nexus 
between the speech in question and the operation of the school. 
Finally, as demonstrated in Wisniewski and Doninger, the Second 
Circuit has adopted the most expansive rule which allows the public 
school entity to regulate student speech if the school entity itself can 
determine that there is a foreseeable risk that the speech will lead to a 
material and substantial interference with school operations.  
 
 87. Id. at 39 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969)). 
 88. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49–51 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 89. Id. at 49. 
 90. Id. at 50 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40). 
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT SPLIT: LAYSHOCK AND BLUE MOUNTAIN  
The debate over whether the threshold question of on-campus 
versus off-campus speech should persevere91—whether a school need 
show nothing more than a foreseeable risk of a material and 
substantial disruption,92 or whether an entirely new standard should 
apply93—is coming to a head as demonstrated by two cases that 
resulted in a Third Circuit split: Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage School District94 and J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
School District.95 Based on nearly identical facts, the cases were heard 
by separate three-judge panels that produced opposite holdings in 
opinions filed on exactly the same day. In response to petitions filed 
by parties in both cases, both opinions were vacated and were 
reheard en banc in June 2010.96 As of writing this Comment, the 
court has not published a new opinion for either case. 
 
 
 91. See, e.g., Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for an 
Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 129 (2007) (maintaining that the threshold question should be preserved to 
prevent schools from applying Tinker to off-campus speech); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student 
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008) (contending that minors are 
entitled to strong free speech rights and that the application of Tinker, regardless of whether 
the speech was on- or off-campus provides insufficient protection to such rights). 
 92. See, e.g., Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using 
Tinker to Regulate Off-campus Student Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 134 (2009) 
(averring that schools should be permitted to make a “reasonabl[e] forecast” of a material and 
substantial disruption in order to apply Tinker and regulate the student speech, even when it 
occurs off-campus); Duffy B. Trager, Note, New Tricks for Old Dogs: The Tinker Standard 
Applied to Cyber-Bullying, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 553 (2009) (asserting that the Tinker standard 
includes and is appropriate for the regulation of cyberbully-esque speech). 
 93. See, e.g., Markey, supra note 91, at 132 (discussing a standard requiring that a 
“student knowingly or recklessly distributes the speech on-campus”); Harriet A. Hoder, Note, 
Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisdiction Over Students’ Online 
Activity, 50 B. C. L. REV. 1563, 1594 (2009) (arguing for a “control and supervision” test 
giving the school authority to regulate speech only when the school has assumed “control and 
supervision” over the student at the time the student offers her speech). 
 94. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 95. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted No. 08-438, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 96. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-
438, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
518 
Layshock and Blue Mountain were not the first cases the Third 
Circuit heard on this issue. Nine years before the Third Circuit split 
itself, it decided Saxe v. State College Area School District,97 a case 
that would be cited by several other courts examining the issue of 
school regulation of student speech.98 In Saxe, the Third Circuit 
showed a reluctance to employ a foreseeable risk standard. The case 
arose when a student preemptively challenged a school policy on 
harassment claiming that it violated the First Amendment.99 The 
court’s main holding was that the harassment policy was 
unconstitutionally overbroad, and would sweep in a large amount of 
student speech that should be protected.100 Because there was 
neither an actual restriction nor any student speech at issue in this 
case, the question of where the speech would occur was largely 
ignored.101 However, in its discussion of Tinker, the court reiterated 
that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression”102 but that 
a restriction on speech may pass constitutional muster if the “school 
can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one 
based on past incidents arising out of similar speech.”103 Thus, the 
court indicated that when Tinker is applied, the proof of the material 
and substantial interference must be specific and concrete.104 This 
precedential interpretation of the Tinker standard appears to hold 
schools to a higher standard than the foreseeable risk language 
promulgated by the Second Circuit, but was subsequently 
overlooked to varying extents in both cases that follow.105 
 
 97. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 98. See, e.g., Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 296–97, 305–06, 312, 314; Layshock, 593 
F.3d at 257, 261; Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 325, 327–29 (2d Cir. 2006); Bowler v. 
Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 176 (D. Mass. 2007); Governor Wentworth Reg’l 
Sch. Dist. v. Hendrickson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (D. N.H. 2006); Grzywna v. 
Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Killion v. Franklin 
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453, 455, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 99. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 203–04. 
 100. Id. at 214. 
 101. But see id. at 216 n.11 (“Saxe even suggests that the Policy could even be read to 
cover conduct occurring outside of school premises. This reading is not implausible based on 
the Policy’s plain language, and would raise additional constitutional questions.”). 
 102. Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id.  
 105. Though both Laycock and Blue Moutain cite Saxe, neither relies substantially on the 
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A. Layshock: Limiting the Schoolmaster’s Reach Under Fraser 
In Layshock, the school district relied heavily on the sufficient 
nexus and foreseeable risk standards from Bethlehem and the Second 
Circuit cases discussed supra. The Layshock court summarily rejected 
the school district’s arguments and held that where a high school 
senior had created a “parody profile” of his principal on a popular 
social networking site using his grandmother’s computer while at his 
grandmother’s house,106 the school district’s punishment of off-
campus student speech was impermissibly violative of the student’s 
First Amendment free speech rights.107 The student did not use any 
school resources to create the profile, but he did copy a photo of the 
principal from the school district’s website.108 The profile contained 
language that was profane and lewd and that was clearly disparaging 
towards the principal.109 It was not long before most of the student 
body had at least heard of, if not seen, the profile.110 In this case, the 
students were able to view and did view the profile on school 
computers during school hours.111 The student claimed that the 
profile was made as a joke,112 but was later suspended from school 
for ten days, placed in the Alternative Education Program at the 
school for the remainder of the school year, prohibited from 
participating in any extracurricular activities, and barred from 
participating in his graduation ceremony at the conclusion of the 
year.113  
The district court analyzed the case first under the sufficient 
nexus standard and held that the school district was unable to 
“establish[] a sufficient nexus between [the student’s] speech and a 
 
specific application of Tinker. Thus, though Saxe as a whole is not overlooked, certainly the 
analysis concerning the proper application of the Tinker standard is. 
 106. Layshock ex. rel Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 
2010), vacated, reh’g granted 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. See id. 252–53. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 253. 
 112. Id. at 253 n.4. 
 113. Id. at 254. Other students who created subsequent fictional profiles of the principal 
that were more vulgar and offensive than the original parody profile were not punished at all. 
Id. 
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substantial disruption of the school environment.”114 On appeal, the 
Third Circuit held that the punishment in this case was an improper 
regulation that infringed on the student’s First Amendment rights, 
that there was no nexus between the student speech and a material 
and substantial interference with school operation, and that the 
school district could not punish the student based only on the fact 
that his speech came within the physical boundaries of the school.115  
The Layshock court first examined the school district’s argument 
that the student had “entered” school property by accessing the 
school district website to copy the principal’s picture.116 The court 
compared the facts in this case with Thomas v. Board of Education 
where the court held that school regulation of the speech in question 
was impermissible even when students stored an offensive student-
written and student-edited periodical in a school classroom and 
completed some work on the publication at school while using 
school resources.117 In Layshock, the court held that the connection 
between the student’s conduct and the school was even more fragile 
than the connection in Thomas and refused to “allow the School 
District to stretch its authority so far that it reaches [a student] 
sitting in his grandmother’s home after school.”118 The court added 
that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow 
the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s 
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that they 
can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored 
activities.”119 
The Layshock court then turned to the school district’s second 
argument—that the speech was permissibly regulated because it was 
lewd and vulgar and “was aimed at the School District community 
and the Principal and was accessed on campus by [the student] [and] 
[i]t was reasonably foreseeable that the profile would come to the 
attention of the School District and the Principal.”120 The court 
 
 114. Id. at 258 (quoting Layschock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. 
Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)). 
 115. Id. at 263. 
 116. Id. at 259. 
 117. Id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)).  
 118. Id. at 260. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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analyzed this question pursuant to Fraser rather than Tinker because 
the school district failed to show that the student’s out of school 
speech created a material and substantial interference of school 
operations.121 Importantly, the court distinguished key cases122 upon 
which the school district’s argument relied, and through which 
various courts had sanctioned the regulation of off-campus student 
speech that was lewd, vulgar, and/or offensive under Tinker’s 
material and substantial interference analysis, rather than under the 
narrow exception for such speech created in Fraser.123 The Layshock 
court reiterated that the “willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s 
expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure, 
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach 
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”124 The court stopped short of making 
a precise determination of the perimeter of the schoolmaster’s reach, 
but held that in this case the student speech did not disrupt the 
school as required by Tinker and that, pursuant to Fraser, even if the 
off-campus speech is lewd, vulgar, or offensive, it is still protected 
under the First Amendment.125 
B. Blue Mountain: Expanding the Schoolmaster’s Reach Under Tinker 
The facts in Blue Mountain closely parallel those in Layshock, but 
the analysis and subsequent holdings are significantly divergent. In 
Blue Mountain, a middle school student and her friend working at 
their respective homes, using personal computers, and using an 
instant messaging program to facilitate their collaboration, created a 
sham profile on a social networking site.126 Unlike the profile in 
Layshock, this profile did not mention the real name of any person, 
but like the Layshock profile, it did use a photograph of the school 
 
 121. Id. at 261. 
 122.  Including Bethlehem (sufficient nexus), Wisniewski (foreseeable risk), and Doninger 
(foreseeable risk). 
 123. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 261. 
 124. Id. at 263 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 
1979)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. 593 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated Apr. 
09, 2010). 
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principal that the students had copied from the school district’s 
website.127  
 
Like the profile in Layshock, this profile included insulting and 
vulgar content, and like the student in Layshock, the student here 
asserted that she created the site as a joke with her friends.128 In this 
case, though, the profile could not be viewed on-campus using 
school-owned computers because the school’s network blocked the 
particular social networking site.129 Still, word of the profile spread 
and students accessed it from other locations.130 The students in this 
case were also suspended from school for ten days, but unlike the 
more severe penalties imposed on the student in Layshock, these 
students were not punished beyond the temporary suspension from 
school.131 Ultimately, one of the students brought suit claiming that 
the school had violated her First Amendment right to free speech.132 
The district court granted summary judgment to the school district, 
holding that even though the student created the profile at her 
home, and even though the profile did not materially and 
substantially disrupt school, the school district’s punishment of her 
speech did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights because 
her “lewd and vulgar off-campus speech had an effect on campus.”133 
In her appeal, the student argued that her speech, even if it were 
lewd and vulgar, was protected by the First Amendment “because it 
occurred entirely outside the Middle School” and generally, the First 
Amendment protects even lewd and vulgar speech outside of a 
school setting.134 Unlike the Layshock court, the Blue Mountain court 
declined to engage in an analysis under Fraser and instead went 
immediately to Tinker, stating that the speech may be regulated “if it 
would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with the 
right of others.”135 Moreover, the court explicitly stated that an 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 292. 
 129.  Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 295 (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 3:07cv585, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685, *7–8 (M.D. Pa. 2008)). 
 134. Id. at 299 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 25–26 (1971)). 
 135. Id. at 298 (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 
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inquiry regarding where the speech occurred—on- or off-campus—
was unnecessary.136  
In its analysis, the Blue Mountain court relied on Doninger and 
other cases in finding that a school entity does not have to wait for 
an actual disruption of school operations to occur. Contrary to the 
requirement of specific and concrete proof of the material and 
substantial interference articulated in Saxe,137 this court reasoned that 
it could “[look] to all of the circumstances confronting the school 
officials that might reasonably portend disruption.”138 Ultimately, 
the Blue Mountain court held that the “profile presented a 
reasonable possibility of a future disruption” of operations139 and that 
“off-campus speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a 
substantial disruption of or material interference with a school need 
not satisfy any geographical technicality in order to be regulated 
pursuant to Tinker.”140 In stark contrast with the considerably more 
restrained approach by the Layshock court, Blue Mountain’s 
“reasonable possibility of a reasonable threat of a substantial 
disruption or material interference” is imprecise, unwieldy, and even 
more inclusive than the foreseeable risk standard. Moreover, it 
sweeps in mounds of student speech that should clearly be protected 
under the First Amendment. 
Thus, even within the same circuit court, it is unclear whether 
public school entities may permissibly regulate off-campus student 
speech under Tinker, or if off-campus student speech that is vulgar 
or lewd can be analyzed only under Fraser. Additionally, under the 
 
2001)). Note the contradictory reasoning and outcomes in these cases. The Layshock court 
accepted the district court’s holding that the speech in that case did not meet the material and 
substantial requirement of Tinker and thus fell under a Fraser analysis and held the regulation 
of speech impermissible. The Blue Mountain court also accepted the district court’s holding 
that the speech in this case was lewd and vulgar under Fraser, but found the Fraser analysis 
unnecessary because the “profile at issue, though created off-campus, falls within the realm of 
student speech subject to regulation under Tinker” and because the speech had an effect on-
campus, the regulation was constitutionally permissible. Id. 
 136. Id. (citing Saxe 240 F.3d at 212 (holding that when a public school entity “can 
point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on previous incidents 
arising out of similar speech—a restriction may pass constitutional muster”)). 
 137. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 299. 
 138. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 298 (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 
981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139. Id. at 300 (emphasis added). 
 140. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). 
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Tinker analysis, it is unclear whether school entities must establish a 
“sufficient nexus” between the speech in question and the school 
disturbance. It is also unclear whether the school entity must provide 
specific and concrete evidence of similar speech that previously 
resulted in a material and substantial interference with school 
operations, if the school entity must demonstrate a well-founded 
belief that the disruption will occur, or if the school must assert that 
there is merely a foreseeable risk that the speech would result in a 
material and substantial disruption of the school operations. It is in 
this quagmire of erratic case law and ambiguous precedent that these 
cases have been reheard and must now be re-decided. 
IV. INTENT MATTERS: HOW “TRUE THREATS” CAN BRING TINKER 
BACK FROM THE BRINK  
The foreseeable risk standard asserted in Wisniewski and 
Doninger and relied on in the vacated opinion in Blue Mountain 
turns Tinker on its head and will allow ever-increasing regulation of 
student speech. Indeed, there is a foreseeable risk that the previously 
narrow Fraser and Hazelwood exceptions to the protective Tinker 
standard will now be swallowed up and analyzed under the new, 
broader application of Tinker—an application that is designed not to 
protect speech but to more freely regulate it. This seems particularly 
to be the case if Blue Mountain’s “reasonable possibility” standard 
survives. Such a standard leaves the school free to regulate an almost 
indeterminate amount of student off-campus speech.  
This may not initially offend our sense of First Amendment 
protections because the speech that schools want to regulate is often 
profane, rude, violent, or all of the above. Additionally, the publicity 
surrounding the tragic deaths of teenagers who are victims of similar 
speech may encourage us to embrace more rather than less 
regulation of student speech. Approval of censorship of speech or 
conduct that we find offensive or harmful seems to be an appropriate 
response of a civilized society. However, a core belief of American 
society and a fundamental principle of our democracy is that 
“freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of . . . truth.”141 It is this 
strong belief in the freedom to think and speak independent of 
 
 141. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
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interference from the government that has led to the development of 
First Amendment jurisprudence that has vigorously protected speech 
and expressive conduct with the exception of speech or conduct that 
falls within well-defined and narrowly applied categories that reside 
wholly outside the protections of the First Amendment.142  
One such category, “true threats,” 143 is a prospective answer to 
the off-campus student speech question.144 The true threat doctrine 
as established in Watts v. United States145 and reiterated in Virginia 
v. Black146 sets the boundaries of a category of speech that resides 
wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. Such speech 
is a manifestation of the speaker’s purpose “to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence 
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”147 As opposed to a 
questionable mélange of jurisprudence that allows capacious 
regulation of student speech, a true threat analysis would strike the 
 
 142. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 143. See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621–27 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc) (applying Watts’s true threat analysis in a case involving a school regulating student 
speech); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371–73 (9th Cir. 1996) (also 
applying Watts’s threat analysis in a case of a school regulating student speech). The Wisniewski 
court addressed this analysis and dismissed it in the case of schools regulating student speech, 
distinguishing the criminal statute in question in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705 
(1969), from a school entity’s “authority to discipline a student’s expression reasonably 
understood as urging violent conduct.” Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 
2007). That court found it more appropriate to evaluate such cases under Tinker, a case where 
the speech did not involve any threat of violence or personal attack of any kind.  
 144. The ultimate solution to controlling student speech that may qualify as 
cyberbullying must include a combination of legal, social, and educational reform that includes 
regulation of student speech or expressive behavior only on the rare occasion that such speech 
constitutes a true threat to another individual or violates already existing criminal or civil 
statutes as well as 1) help for potential victims to learn how to protect themselves and get help 
when needed; 2) encouragement of a culture and environment of civility and respect; 3) 
programs designed to educate students about appropriate and inappropriate use of humor; and 
4) creation and support for assistance and resources to students and parents regarding bullying 
in general, the risks to bullies and victims, warning signs that a child is bullying or is being 
bullied, networks through which to report instances of cyberbullying, and so forth. This 
Comment is limited to a discussion of the First Amendment implications of regulating off-
campus student speech, but realizes that this problem can and should be attacked from a 
variety of fronts. In narrowing the purview of schools’ authority to regulate speech, the 
Comment does not purport that other attacks on pernicious cyberbullying should be any less 
vigorous. 
 145. 394 U.S. 705 (1968). 
 146. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 147. Id. at 359. 
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proper balance between the interests in protecting children and 
maintaining an effective educational environment, and the interest in 
protecting individual free speech rights. It is consistent with already 
developed First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, the true 
threat standard is more congruent with the strong protections 
initially granted to student speech in Tinker. 
As the principal case on point, Tinker set a standard that was 
highly protective of student speech, particularly speech that was in 
danger of being regulated because of its content or viewpoint. 
Courts have already granted public school entities considerably more 
leeway in regulating student speech when compared with speech that 
the government may generally regulate. This is because though 
neither “students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”148 neither are such 
First Amendment rights “automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings”149 and such rights may be limited according 
to the “special characteristics of the school environment.”150  
The Tinker Court realized that the overwhelming tendency of a 
government organization seeking to maintain order and an 
authoritarian atmosphere would be to limit divergent views through 
censorship. The Court expressly reminds school entities that 
[a]ny departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. 
Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any 
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that 
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or 
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, 
and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this 
kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of 
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in 
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.151 
Thus, the Tinker standard incontrovertibly required that 
[i]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to 
 
 148. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 149. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 150. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 151. Id. at 508–09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1 (1949)). 
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show that its action was caused by something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no 
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct 
would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” the prohibition 
cannot be sustained.152  
However, when students began to engage in off-campus speech 
over the Internet, that speech was immediately available to a 
worldwide audience, and schools were grasping for ways in which to 
control it. As the Third Circuit held in Layshock, Fraser could not be 
extended to regulate vulgar, lewd or offensive off-campus speech. 
Fraser’s exception to Tinker is powerful when applied appropriately 
to lewd or offensive speech at a school-sanctioned event where there 
is a captive audience of other minor school children. In such a case, 
the school may decide whether the speech is lewd, vulgar, or 
offensive and may permissibly regulate such speech. But if such 
speech occurs off-campus, the application of Fraser becomes 
treacherously tenuous. 
Likewise, the narrow exception of Hazelwood did not provide a 
quick or easy remedy to prevent such inappropriate speech over the 
Internet or through text messages. Hazelwood required that the 
speech in question reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school and 
be related to a legitimate pedagogical concern. There is little doubt 
that student speech arising from a posting on a personal networking 
site while at home, outside of school hours, and using the student’s 
own computer or cellular device would not bear the imprimatur of 
the school. And so, schools and courts looked back again to the 
Tinker language. 
If it were possible to commandeer the Tinker standard and show 
that off-campus student speech would cause a material and 
substantial disruption at the school, that might justify the regulation 
of speech that occurs entirely away from campus. Some courts were 
unwilling to stretch Tinker that far and continued to require a 
finding that the speech was implicitly on-campus speech, or that 
there was a sufficient nexus between the speech and the disturbance 
 
 152. Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th 
Cir. 1966)). 
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at the school. However, the most permissive interpretations of 
Tinker required only that the school demonstrate that the speech 
could foreseeably cause a material and substantial disturbance; once 
the school entity could show that, the location where the speech 
occurred no longer had any bearing. The nature of the speech lost its 
relevance as well—it may be lewd, vulgar, or other speech that could 
be otherwise protected under the First Amendment, but if it was 
reasonably foreseeable that it could lead to a substantial disturbance, 
the school could permissibly punish the student for the speech or 
conduct. 
This abundant willingness to justify overbroad regulation of off-
campus student speech pursuant to Tinker is inappropriate and will 
lead to impermissible regulations of student speech. Think for a 
moment about a fictional student, Ahmed, who is Muslim and has 
moved to a school district that is overwhelmingly populated with 
students from conservative Christian homes. On his Facebook 
account, Ahmed begins to post and discuss his religion. There is 
little understanding of Islam in this fictional school district and most 
automatically associate Ahmed’s postings with terrorist acts 
propagated by Islamic extremists. In such a case, there is an 
absolutely foreseeable risk of a material and substantial disturbance at 
the school. The disturbance would, most likely, be related to the 
student’s speech. But the school should absolutely not be allowed to 
punish Ahmed for such speech. Under the First Amendment, such 
speech is vigorously protected.  
The initial Layshock opinion was correct; neither Layshock nor 
Blue Mountain should be analyzed under Tinker because the speech 
occurred away from school property, without the assistance of any 
school resources, and was not offered at or in conjunction with any 
school-sanctioned event. In both cases the speech occurred in the 
privacy of the student’s home or the home of a close family member. 
Extending Tinker to apply to such speech would allow schools to 
exercise in loco parentis influence well beyond appropriate limitations 
and would infringe not only on the student’s free speech and privacy 
rights, but on parents’ rights as well.  
The Layshock court was also correct in holding that the speech 
cannot be regulated under Fraser. Even though the speech may be 
categorized as lewd, or vulgar, it was not offered at a school-
sanctioned event wherein a large number of minor school students 
were a captive audience to the speech in question. This type of 
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speech is of the variety that falls squarely under the protection of the 
First Amendment. The Third Circuit should be reluctant to endorse 
a standard that would open the door to “permissible” regulations of 
student speech that surpass in breadth any previously permissible 
regulation of speech. Even in the case of sexually explicit or obscene 
speech, where the Supreme Court has demonstrated an inclination to 
allow broader state regulation of an individual’s speech compared to 
other types of speech, the boundary of regulation ended at the 
threshold of the speaker’s home. If the Third Circuit were to 
endorse Bethlehem’s ephemeral sufficient nexus standard, 
Wisniewski’s ambiguous foreseeable risk standard, or the reasonable 
possibility test from Blue Mountain, it would extend the 
schoolmaster’s reach where Stanley v. Georgia did not dare tread—
into the privacy of individuals’ households.153 
Rather, because the speech in both cases occurred off-campus 
and not in conjunction with any school-sanctioned activities, the 
Third Circuit should examine the intent of the students and 
determine whether either scenario rose to the level of a true threat 
that could be a constitutional regulation of student off-campus 
speech.154 The true threat doctrine encompasses speech “where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals.”155 Though “the speaker need not actually 
intend to carry out the threat,” and courts may consider the victim’s 
subjective fear of violence,156 the government would bear the burden 
of the proving that a true threat existed, and the expression in 
 
 153. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (invalidating state laws that regulate private possession of 
obscene materials). Granted, the speech in Stanley was an adult consuming pornography, and it 
may be more accurate here to think of the publication or production of speech—for example, 
pornography. Even then, the Supreme Court has only allowed regulation of speech that either 
meets the narrow obscenity exception or that is demonstrated to actually harm individuals 
unable to consent to such harm. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For 
example, the production of child pornography cannot be constitutionally regulated unless it is 
produced with actual minors in the parts of the children. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 
535 U.S. 234 (2002). In other words, one may engage in speech by producing child 
pornography using actors who look young but are of age to consent or using computer 
generated imagery. Id. at 256. 
 154. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 155. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 156. Id. 
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question would be “taken in context” with regard to “the nature of 
the statement and the reaction of the listeners.”157  
In both Layshock and Blue Mountain, the students indicated, and 
the school districts did not dispute, that the profiles were created as a 
joke. Both students apologized to the affected administrators and 
indicated that they did not intend any harm. Though their speech 
was immature, vulgar, lewd, ill-advised, and perhaps plain stupid, it 
can be credited to adolescents who have not yet developed a clear 
understanding of what type of online speech can be appropriate 
humor and what is not. In neither case, though, did the students 
demonstrate sufficient intent to communicate a serious expression of 
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to an individual or a 
particular group of individuals. Indeed, the speech in question here 
was more akin to the “political hyperbole” of Watts v. United 
States158 that was “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating 
a[n] . . . opposition” to a person in authority.159 If we are willing to 
limit this kind of student speech, it will effectively chill speech not 
only while the students are school-aged, but will likely chill anti-
establishment speech even later in life. Additionally, in both Layshock 
and Blue Mountain, the “victim” of the speech was an adult in a 
position of considerable power and authority over the minor speaker 
with the means to pursue alternative remedies for any imagined or 
actual harm the speech may have caused.  
The more difficult question is whether such an analysis is 
sufficient for cases that involve student-on-student cyberbullying. 
Indeed, the true threat standard can be used effectively not only for 
student-on-teacher or student-on-administrator cyberbullying, but 
also for student-on-student cyberbullying. Such speech would also 
be regulated when the school can demonstrate that it rises to the 
level of a true threat. The school may rely on the victim’s subjective 
fear of violence, but must also consider the context in which the 
expression was offered as well as the reaction of the audience to the 
expression. If the school successfully carries that evidentiary burden, 
then it could constitutionally regulate the speech in question. 
Otherwise, the interest in protecting the speaker’s First Amendment 
 
 157. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1968). 
 158. Id. at 708. 
 159. Id. 
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rights would outweigh the interest in limiting such speech. Recall 
the facts of Emmett—a student created a website with fake obituaries 
for his friends and a poll application by which visitors could vote on 
who would die next.160 Such a site could seem terribly threatening. 
However, “[t]he obituaries were written tongue-in-cheek, [and 
were] inspired . . . by a creative writing class.”161 Additionally, the 
student deleted the site after it was characterized as a “hit list” on 
the local news. Moreover, the school did “not present[] any evidence 
that any student actually felt threatened by the web site.”162 
Generally, the evidence suggested that it was a joke and that no 
harm was intended. Though it was likely an infantile and unwise 
expression, and though it may have even resulted in some students 
feeling intimidated,163 it was not likely a true threat.  
In contrast, consider a hypothetical situation based loosely on 
other cyberbullying cases. Suppose that a teenager, Cassie, is angry 
with a classmate, Victor. Suppose Cassie creates a fake profile on a 
social networking site of an imaginary girl, Fiona. As Fiona, Cassie 
interacts online with Victor. She pretends to be interested in him, 
becomes his confidante, his friend, and perhaps even his love 
interest. Then, Cassie starts using Fiona to make threats to Victor. 
She uses information she has discovered to humiliate and frighten 
Victor. Imagine she posts a fake obituary of Victor in a place where 
Victor will see it, and suppose she posts in Fiona’s social networking 
status, “Watch out, Victor. You are next.” Imagine Victor is 
frightened by the threat and suppose the school marshals ample 
evidence that Cassie intended her speech to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence 
towards Victor. In this case, Cassie’s intent makes a difference and 
pushes her actions into the realm of a true threat which could be 
permissibly regulated by a school entity.  
In addition to permissible regulation of student speech by 
schools pursuant to the true threat analysis, much speech that can be 
categorized as cyberbullying is punishable through criminal or civil 
statutes that constitutionally regulate harassment, defamation, 
 
 160. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 
2000). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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slander, stalking, and so on. Furthermore, social and educational 
programs can make effective inroads in this arena without posing a 
threat to individual free speech rights. This Comment does not 
suggest that we leave victims of cyberbullying with no remedy, only 
that we tread carefully when extending the power of the government 
to regulate speech even when, perhaps especially when, that 
regulation is coming from a powerful school entity and is directed at 
students directly under their authority.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the area of law is relatively new and because the U.S. 
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue of speech that could 
be defined as cyberbullying, state and federal courts have struggled 
to fit recent instances of off-campus digital or electronic speech into 
the foundational framework created by Tinker, Fraser, and 
Hazelwood. The regulated speech in each of those foundational cases 
was speech occurring on school grounds or in connection with a 
school-sanctioned class or event, or both. 
Cases dealing with student-on-teacher or student-on-
administrator cyberbullying, or both, have demonstrated a disturbing 
disposition to extend Tinker to allow regulation of off-campus 
student speech that would normally fall squarely in the realm of 
protected speech pursuant to the First Amendment. This is an 
inappropriate extension of power to government agents and will 
result in the regulation of speech that should be protected. 
Rather than cling to a tenuous line of case law that permits an 
overbroad regulation of off-campus student speech, courts should 
engage in a true threat analysis to determine whether the off-campus 
student speech in question was offered with the intent to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to engage in an act of 
violence against the threatened party. In many cases, the speakers 
will lack the necessary intent because the speech was offered as ill-
advised humor with perhaps little understanding of the total effects 
the speech would have.  
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In conclusion, utilizing the true threat analysis will in no way 
diminish the criminal or civil remedies available to victims of such 
speech. Rather, it will provide apposite protection for the First 
Amendment right of free speech that we hold central to our culture 
and which is a foundational principle of our democracy. 
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